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Our ability to treat one another well, or even decently, depends on our 
capacities to imagine, simulate, sympathize, empathize, and intuit other 
people. These are a wide array of different, similar, and overlapping, capacities,
essential to human social life. I shall lump them all together as imagining (but 
see). We imagine what it is like for one another, and we act accordingly. We 
tend not to give people presents they will hate, or to spare people experiences 
they will enjoy.
I used to think that this was the fundamental link between psychology and 
ethics. Moral behaviour requires specific social skills, and our evolution as 
social creatures has given us at least crude approximations to them. I still 
think that there is a connection between our social capacities and our standard 
rules of morality. But I have come to think that both are blind to something 
important, and that focusing on it shows big gaps in interpersonal imagination 
and in standard morality. The labels for these gaps are damage and empathetic
failure. 
Rape and sexual abuse are dramatically awful. But a realization of quite how 
awful they can be, and the grounds for their awfulness, waited for our time: 
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while decent people would have thought of these as wrong, often very wrong, 
they would have traced the wrongness to violations of autonomy and infliction 
of short term pain. The perpetrator is doing something to someone against 
their will, and it hurts. In other cultures the wrongness is also traced to factors 
that now seem to us perverse. In Roman culture the rape of a daughter or a 
slave is taken as an offence against the property of the paterfamilias, and in 
Greek culture the rape of a woman in the temple of a goddess will usually lead 
to the goddess’ anger at the woman for defiling her space, rather than at the 
rapist. One is reminded of reports of contemporary cultures in which rape 
victims are charged with adultery. We have come to see a basic thing that is 
missing from these reactions. The victims are often damaged , though the 
psychology is still somewhat obscure. They can be prone to depression, 
irrational feelings of guilt, a sense of being bad and unworthy, and in some 
cases suicidal tendencies. 
The authorities of the Catholic Church are generally decent and sympathetic 
people, and they never dreamt of anything but condemnation of abusive 
priests. But they took the grounds for the condemnation to be forbidden sex 
rather than terrible wounding. Though this is a conjecture, some support is 
given by the papal document Sacramentum Poenitentiae , which takes the 
crime to be a violation of the commandment against adultery. 
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were invisible until recently. Post-traumatic stress , first noticed as "shell 
shock" after the first world war, is an example. We now see it as occurring also 
in milder forms. Similarly we thought of torture as the infliction of great pain, 
which it usually is. But in so doing we ignored the great injury to a person's 
conception of herself and her ability to function, of which there is now abudant 
evidence. Torture, like post-traumatic stress, can also take milder forms, and 
can be subtle and psychological rather than overtly physical. There are many 
other less dramatic kinds of damage. We have learned that corporal 
punishment  of children does not make them become well-adjusted and 
considerate adults. A vitally important topic is that of subtle implicit prejudice. 
There is now a lot of evidence that having one's attention drawn to one's 
membership in a group presented as less capable reduces one’s performance 
on tasks requiring attention and skill. It works like a taunt or a tease, disabling
one.
Why were these things ignored? I suspect two related factors. One is the 
special nature of our capacities for imagining each other. They have developed 
to mediate standard forms of social life and cooperative activity. So they focus 
on grasping other people's intentions and actions: the desires that actions aim 
to satisfy and the beliefs that shape them. But while damage has effects on a 
person's intentions and desires it does not consist in them, so these capacities 
tend to ignore it. The other is emphasis on conscious states of mind. But 
people often are not consciously aware that they are damaged. I suspect that 
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what their common origins might be. Both point to gaps in our intuitive grasp 
of human psychology. 
There are important things about other people that we are not good at 
imagining. The kinds of damage I have been mentioning are examples, and the
ways that human cultures have misunderstood them is testimony to our 
blindness on these topics. But there are many others: depression, phobias, 
anxiety, neurological damage. There are also teasing and bullying, which can 
take very everyday forms, in which people have no idea of the harm they are 
causing. (One interesting feature of teasing, and also of some worse action is 
that the person doing it will be guided by an awareness of the discomfort of 
the other person they are doing it to. The discomfort but not the damage. 
Moreover the perpetrator will often delight in imagining the other person's 
horrified or annoyed awareness — imagination even — of them.) Many items 
on the list are phenomena that are best explained neurologically rather than 
psychologically, but to say this is just to relabel what we don't understand. 
The gaps in our imagination have more serious consequences than just leaving
us puzzled about ourselves and others. They affect our lives quite deeply. One 
aspect of this is a warping of our moral vocabulary and principles. Right action 
consists, we might think, in helping people get what they want, respecting 
their autonomy, giving them pleasure rather than pain, and cooperating with 
them for mutual benefit. Moral theories in philosophy differ in which of these 
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ones. (For utilitarianism the central concept is the pleasure/pain balance, for 
contractarianism cooperation, and for Kantian ethics autonomy.) But the 
essence of morality is taken, both in philosophy and I think in most of our 
everyday thinking, to lie in these areas.
But this leaves out many of the effects we have on one another. You can do 
someone a lot of damage, without causing them pain or violating their wishes. 
Someone with diminished self-respect may even think that they are enjoying 
the denigration or teasing that results in their reduced accomplishments and 
reduced satisfaction in their life. For that matter, you can do someone good, 
help them, without bringing them pleasure or assisting with something they 
want. A simple example is a parent talking articulately in a give-and-take way 
with a child.
It is surely not controversial that there are gaps in our imagination of one 
another. And it is surely not controversial that we can harm one another in 
deep and hard to discern ways. But my claim is that each of these is more 
extensive and more varied than we normally think. And that they are related: 
damage is hard to imagine. For much damage does not consist in pain and is 
not reflected in a person's conscious life or the social sense of their 
acquaintances. If this is right there is a very important project of 
understanding and dealing with these things better than we do. It requires the 
combined attention of philosophers — both philosophers of mind and moral 
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— and social thinkers. It also requires an openness to tinkering with deeply 
ingrained ideas that regulate our treatment of one another. That is quite 
demanding; but the stakes are high.
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